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Phase-shift Fault Analysis of Grain v1
Viliam Hromada, and Tibor Petho¨
Abstract—This paper deals with the phase-shift fault analysis
of stream cipher Grain v1. We assume that the attacker is able
to desynchronize the linear and nonlinear registers of the cipher
during the keystream generation phase by either forcing one of
the registers to clock one more time, while the other register is not
clocked, or by preventing one of the registers from clocking, while
the other register is clocked. Using this technique, we are able to
obtain the full inner state of the cipher in reasonable time (under
12 hours on a single PC) by using 150 bits of unfaulted keystream,
600 bits of faulted keystreams and by correctly guessing 28 bits
of the linear register.
Keywords—stream ciphers, Grain v1, fault analysis, phase-shift
attack, desynchronization attack
I. INTRODUCTION
FAULT analysis is a relatively new approach in the crypt-analysis of stream ciphers. It is based on actively tam-
pering with the device and inducing faults in the computation
which results in keystreams different from the unfaulted one.
This method of analysis was introduced in paper [6] by Hoch
and Shamir. In their paper, authors proposed bit-flipping and
phase-shift as two default fault analysis methods. Bit-flipping
is changing the value of a single bit of the device’s register,
while phase-shift is the clocking of a certain device’s register
while the other registers are not clocked. This type of an
attack is sometimes referred to as a desynchronization attack.
The security of several stream ciphers has been investigated
regarding this type of an attack, e.g. Trivium [7], A5/1 [4] or
irregularly decimated generators [8].
In 2008, a stream cipher Grain v1 [5] was selected as one
of the finalists of the eSTREAM project. The goal of the
project was to find a set of stream ciphers suitable for different
cryptographic applications. Grain was chosen as one of the
most suitable stream ciphers for hardware implementation thus
making it interesting for fault analysis, since its design is based
on two feedback shift registers that are clocked at the same
time and the output is a nonlinear combination of registers’
bits.
Several fault attacks on Grain v1 have been published, e.g.
[1], [2], [3]. To our knowledge, all published fault attacks on
Grain v1 use the bit-flipping technique. We therefore focused
on the phase-shift fault analysis of the cipher in combination
with a method of algebraic cryptanalysis - SAT solvers. In
the attack, we desynchronize the cipher’s inner state by either
forcing one extra clock in the linear or non-linear register,
or by stopping one of the two registers for one clock. This
This work was supported by the grant VEGA No. 1/0159/17.
V. Hromada is with Faculty of Electrical Engineering and Information Tech-
nology, Slovak University of Technology in Bratislava, Bratislava, Slovakia
(e-mail: viliam.hromada@stuba.sk).
T. Petho¨ is a graduate of Slovak University of Technology in Bratislava,
Bratislava, Slovakia (e-mail: 8847@is.stuba.sk)
desynchronization is done in the moment directly after the
initialization of the device. We investigate the mathematical
model of the attack by representing the output bits as a set of
non-linear equations over GF(2) in variables that represent the
bits of the inner state of the cipher and then try to solve this
system of equations by using SAT-solvers to find some inner
state of the cipher. The attack was simulated (implemented)
in the mathematical package SAGE.
It stems from our experiments that guessing correctly at
least 28 bits of the linear register of Grain v1 is sufficient to
solve the system of equations under 12 hours on a single PC,
while inducing all four possible clocking faults and generating
150 bits per keystream. Our further experiments suggest that
the most important fault for the success of the attack is the
stopping of the linear register for one clock, since omitting the
corresponding equations led to the most significant increase in
the time needed to solve the system of equations and if we
attack the cipher by using only this fault, the time needed to
solve the system is lower than in other three cases.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes
the cipher Grain v1 and its used representation. Section 3
contains the description of our attack. In Section 4 we present
the results of the experiments and we conclude the paper in
Section 5.
II. STREAM CIPHER GRAIN V1
Grain v1 [5] is a hardware-oriented synchronous stream
cipher. It generates a sequence of keystream bits from an 80-
bit secret key and an 64-bit initialization vector. Its inner state
consists of 160 bits stored in two feedback shift registers,
one linear (LFSR) and one non-linear (NFSR), as depicted
on Figure 1.
Fig. 1. Cipher Grain v1 [5]
The content of the LFSR is denoted si, si+1, ..., si+79. The
feedback polynomial of the LFSR, denoted f(x), is a primitive
polynomial defined as:
1 + x18 + x29 + x42 + x57 + x67 + x80
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i.e. the update function of the LFSR is
si+80 = si+62 + si+51 + si+38 + si+23 + si+13 + si (1)
The content of the NFSR is denoted bi, bi+1, ..., bi+79.
The feedback polynomial of the LFSR, denoted g(x), is a
polynomial defined as:
g(x) =1 + x17 + x20 + x28 + x35 + x43 + x47 + x52 + x59
+ x65 + x71 + x80 + x17x20 + x43x47 + x65x71
+ x20x28x35 + x47x52x59 + x17x35x52x71
+ x20x28x43x47 + x17x20x59x65 + x17x20x28x35x43
+ x47x52x59x65x71 + x28x35x43x47x52x59
and the update function of the NFSR is
bi+80 =si + bi+62 + bi+60 + bi+52 + bi+45 + bi+37
+ bi+33 + bi+28 + bi+21 + bi+14 + bi+9 + bi
+ bi+63bi+60 + bi+37bi+33 + bi+15bi+9
+ bi+60bi+52bi+45 + bi+35bi+28bi+21
+ bi+63bi+45bi+28bi+9 + bi+60bi+52bi+37bi+33
+ bi+63bi+60bi+21bi+15 + bi+63bi+60bi+52bi+45bi+37
+ bi+33bi+28bi+21bi+15bi+9
+ bi+52bi+45bi+37bi+33bi+28bi+21
(2)
At a given time i the inner state of the cipher, denoted ISi,
is:
ISi = (bi, bi+1, ..., b79+i, si, si+1, ..., s79+i), i ≥ 0.
During the keystream generating phase, 5 of these variables are
taken as an input to nonlinear filtering function h(x) defined
as:
h(x) =x1 + x4 + x0x3 + x2x3 + x3x4 + x0x1x2 + x0x2x3
+ x0x2x4 + x1x2x4 + x2x3x4
where the variables x0, x1, x2, x3, x4 correspond to variables
si+3, si+25, si+46, si+64, bi+63. The output function of the
cipher is taken as
zi =
∑
k∈A
bi+k + h(si+3, si+25, si+46, si+64, bi+63) (3)
where A = {1, 2, 4, 10, 31, 43, 56}.
The initial state of the cipher is:
IS0 = (b0, b1, ..., b79, s0, s1, ..., s79).
The initial state is initialized with the secret key
K = (k0, k1, ..., k79) and the initialization vector
IV = (u0, u1, ..., u63) as follows:
bi = ki, i ∈ {0, 1, ..., 79}
si = ui, i ∈ {0, 1, ..., 63}
si = 1, i ∈ {64, 65, ..., 79}.
After the initialization, the cipher is clocked 160 times
without generating any keystream bits. Instead, the output
function is xored back with the inputs of the registers. After
that Grain v1 generates one output bit per each clock. All the
above equations are over the finite field GF (2). If the inner
state of Grain v1 is known at an arbitrary time, it is not difficult
to clock the cipher backwards. Therefore, if we are able to find
out the inner state IStj at a time tj , then we are able to clock
the cipher backwards to the initial state and directly get the
80-bit secret key K.
III. PHASE-SHIFTING IN GRAIN V1
The idea of phase-shifting is to desynchronize the registers
of the cipher. If an encryption device consists of more regis-
ters, basically they are either clocked together, or are clock-
controlled, meaning that the output of one register controls
the clocking of another register. The de-synchronization of
the device is then performed by tampering with the clocking
of one of the registers, e.g. one of the registers stops for one
clock, or is clocked one time more beforehand. Several papers
were published that use this technique to successfully attack
different stream ciphers [4], [7], [8]. Our model of this attack
assumes that the following conditions are met:
1) The cryptographic device that implements Grain v1 is
in the possession of the attacker.
2) The attacker can use the device to generate keystreams
of an arbitrary length.
3) The attacker can tamper with the clocking of the reg-
isters by either clocking one of the registers one clock
ahead, or by stopping one of the registers for one clock.
4) The attacker has perfect control over the moment of
phase-shift.
5) The attacker is able to reset the device to its original
proper unfaulted state.
Point 4 means that the attacker is able to run the initializa-
tion phase of Grain v1 and only after that desynchronizes the
registers. He then proceeds to generate the faulted keystream.
In the beginning of the attack, at the time moment t0
the inner state ISt0 can be represented by 2 sequences:
{bi}79i=0, {si}79i=0. For simplicity, at time moment t0 we set
i = 0.
We distinguish four different situations, depending on the
affected register and on type of the fault.
A. Stopping the LFSR for one clock
Let us now assume that we stop the clocking of LFSR for
one clock, i.e. we clock only the NFSR and produce the output.
The inner state of Grain v1 changes as follows:
(b0, b1, ..., b79, s0, s1, ..., s79)
↓
(b1, b2, ..., b
A
80, s0, s1, ..., s79)
We use the exponent A to distinguish between the original
unfaulted bits and bits affected by stopping the linear register.
In this case, the new feedback bit bA80 is equal to b80 and the
affected output bit zA0 is equal to z0. However, in the next
clock, with LFSR clocking properly,
(b1, b2, ..., b
A
80, s0, s1, ..., s79
↓
(b2, b3, ..., b
A
81, s1, s2, ..., s
A
80)
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the new feedback bit bA81 is
bA81 =s0 + b63 + b61 + b53 + b46 + b38 + b34 + b29 + b22
+ b15 + b10 + b1 + b64b61 + b38b34 + b16b10
+ b61b53b46 + b36b29b22 + b64b46b29b10 + b61b53b38b34
+ b64b61b22b16 + b64b61b53b46b38
+ b34b29b22b16b10 + b53b46b38b34b29b22
and bA81 + b81 = s0 + s1, i.e. they differ. Also the output bit
zA1 is
zA1 =
∑
k∈K
b1+k + h(s3, s25, s46, s64, b64)
The feedback bits of LFSR are unaffected by this fault, since
they depend only on bits of LFSR, so sA80+i = s80+i.
In general, if the linear register is stopped for one clock,
then the equations are as follows:
bAi = bi, 0 ≤ i ≤ 80 (4)
zA0 = z0 (5)
sAi = si, i ≥ 0 (6)
bAi+80 =s
A
i−1 + b
A
i+62 + b
A
i+60 + b
A
i+52 + b
A
i+45 + b
A
i+37
+ bAi+33 + b
A
i+28 + b
A
i+21 + b
A
i+14 + b
A
i+9 + b
A
i
+ bAi+63b
A
i+60 + b
A
i+37b
A
i+33 + b
A
i+15b
A
i+9
+ bAi+60b
A
i+52b
A
i+45 + b
A
i+35b
A
i+28b
A
i+21
+ bAi+63b
A
i+45b
A
i+28b
A
i+9 + b
A
i+60b
A
i+52b
A
i+37b
A
i+33
+ bAi+63b
A
i+60b
A
i+21b
A
i+15 + b
A
i+63b
A
i+60b
A
i+52b
A
i+45b
A
i+37
+ bAi+33b
A
i+28b
A
i+21b
A
i+15b
A
i+9
+ bAi+52b
A
i+45b
A
i+37b
A
i+33b
A
i+28b
A
i+21, i ≥ 1
(7)
zAi =
∑
k∈A
bAi+k + h(s
A
i+2, s
A
i+24, s
A
i+45, s
A
i+63, b
A
i+63), i ≥ 1
(8)
All the above equations are over GF (2).
In this case, the number of variables increases after each
clock of the cipher. In the beginning at time t0 we have 160
variables representing the state ISt0 . During the first clock,
when the LFSR is not clocking, we get one new variable -
the new bit of NFSR. Afterwards, after each clock we get 2
new variables. Therefore, after N clocks of Grain v1 we have
2N − 1 + 160 variables in our system.
The number of equations also depends on the number of
clocks. After the first faulted clock, we get equations (4) and
(5). Afterwards, after each clock we get one linear equation
of type (6) two non-linear equations of type (7) and (8), i.e.
after N clocks we get 3N − 1 equations.
B. Forcing one extra clock in the LFSR
Let us now assume that we force the LFSR to clock one
extra time, while the NFSR does not clock and also the cipher
does not generate an output bit. The inner state of Grain v1
changes as follows:
(b0, b1, ..., b79, s0, s1, ..., s79)
↓
(b0, b1, ..., b79, s1, s2, ..., s
B
80)
We use the exponent B to distinguish between the original
unfaulted bits and bits affected by forcing the linear register
to clock. The feedback bit sB80 is equal to s80, the NFSR does
not clock and also the cipher does not generate an output bit.
In the first clock after the fault induction
(b0, b1, ..., b79, s1, s2, ..., s
B
80)
↓
(b1, b2, ..., b
B
80, s2, s3, ..., s
B
81)
the new feedback bit bB80 is
bB80 =s1 + b62 + b60 + b52 + b45 + b37 + b33 + b28 + b21 + b14+
b9 + bi + b63b60 + b37b33 + b15b9 + b60b52b45 + b35b28b21+
b63b45b28b9 + b60b52b37b33 + b63b60b21b15 + b63b60b52b45b37+
b33b28b21b15b9 + b52b45b37b33b28b21
and bB80 + b80 = s0 + s1, i.e. they differ. Also the output bit
zB0 is
zB0 =
∑
k∈K
bk + h(s4, s26, s47, s65, b63)
The feedback bits of LFSR are unaffected by this fault, since
they depend only on bits of LFSR, so sB80+i = s80+i.
In general, if the linear register is forced to clock one more
time, then the equations are as follows:
bBi = bi, 0 ≤ i ≤ 79 (9)
sBi+80 = si+80, i ≥ 0 (10)
bBi+80 =s
B
i+1 + b
B
i+62 + b
B
i+60 + b
B
i+52 + b
B
i+45 + b
B
i+37
+ bBi+33 + b
B
i+28 + b
B
i+21 + b
B
i+14 + b
B
i+9 + b
B
i
+ bBi+63b
B
i+60 + b
B
i+37b
B
i+33 + b
B
i+15b
B
i+9
+ bBi+60b
B
i+52b
B
i+45 + b
B
i+35b
B
i+28b
B
i+21
+ bBi+63b
B
i+45b
B
i+28b
B
i+9 + b
B
i+60b
B
i+52b
B
i+37b
B
i+33
+ bBi+63b
B
i+60b
B
i+21b
B
i+15 + b
B
i+63b
B
i+60b
B
i+52b
B
i+45b
B
i+37
+ bBi+33b
B
i+28b
B
i+21b
B
i+15b
B
i+9
+ bBi+52b
B
i+45b
B
i+37b
B
i+33b
B
i+28b
B
i+21, i ≥ 0
(11)
zBi =
∑
k∈A
bBi+k + h(s
B
i+4, s
B
i+26, si+47, s
B
i+65, b
B
i+63), i ≥ 0
(12)
All the above equations are over GF (2).
In this fault, the number of variables increases after each
clock of the cipher. In the beginning at time t0 we have 160
variables representing the state ISt0 . During the first extra
clock of LFSR, we get one new variable - the new bit of LFSR.
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Afterwards, after each clock we get 2 new variables. Therefore,
after N regular clocks of Grain v1 we have 2N + 1 + 160
variables in our system.
The number of equations also depends on the number of
clocks. After the first extra clock, we get equation (10) for
i = 0. Afterwards, after each clock we get one linear equation
of type (10) and two non-linear equations of type (11) and
(12), i.e. after N regular clocks we get 3N + 1 equations.
C. Stopping the NFSR for one clock
This fault is an analogy to the stopping of the linear register,
so we will just state the corresponding equations, while using
the exponent C to distinguish between the original unfaulted
bits and bits affected by stopping the non-linear register for
one clock:
bCi = bi, 0 ≤ i ≤ 79 (13)
zC0 = z0 (14)
sCi = si, i ≥ 0 (15)
bCi+80 =s
C
i+1 + b
C
i+62 + b
C
i+60 + b
C
i+52 + b
C
i+45 + b
C
i+37
+ bCi+33 + b
C
i+28 + b
C
i+21 + b
C
i+14 + b
C
i+9 + b
C
i
+ bCi+63b
C
i+60 + b
C
i+37b
C
i+33 + b
C
i+15b
C
i+9
+ bCi+60b
C
i+52b
C
i+45 + b
C
i+35b
C
i+28b
C
i+21
+ bCi+63b
C
i+45b
C
i+28b
C
i+9 + b
C
i+60b
C
i+52b
C
i+37b
C
i+33
+ bCi+63b
C
i+60b
C
i+21b
C
i+15 + b
C
i+63b
C
i+60b
C
i+52b
C
i+45b
C
i+37
+ bCi+33b
C
i+28b
C
i+21b
C
i+15b
C
i+9
+ bCi+52b
C
i+45b
C
i+37b
C
i+33b
C
i+28b
C
i+21, i ≥ 0
(16)
zCi =
∑
k∈A
bC(i−1)+k + h(s
C
i+3, s
C
i+25, s
C
i+46, s
C
i+64, b
C
i+62), i ≥ 1
(17)
All the above equations are over GF (2).
Similarly to the case of stopping the LFSR, after N clocks
of Grain v1 we have 2N − 1 + 160 variables in a system of
3N − 1 equations.
D. Forcing one extra clock in the NFSR
This fault is an analogy to the forcing of one extra clock
in the linear register, so we will just state the corresponding
equations, while using the exponent D to distinguish between
the original unfaulted bits and bits affected by forcing the non-
linear register to one extra clock:
bDi = bi, 0 ≤ i ≤ 80 (18)
sDi+80 = si+80, i ≥ 0 (19)
bDi+80 =s
D
i−1 + b
D
i+62 + b
D
i+60 + b
D
i+52 + b
D
i+45 + b
D
i+37
+ bDi+33 + b
D
i+28 + b
D
i+21 + b
D
i+14 + b
D
i+9 + b
D
i
+ bDi+63b
D
i+60 + b
D
i+37b
D
i+33 + b
D
i+15b
D
i+9
+ bDi+60b
D
i+52b
D
i+45 + b
D
i+35b
D
i+28b
D
i+21
+ bDi+63b
D
i+45b
D
i+28b
D
i+9 + b
D
i+60b
D
i+52b
D
i+37b
D
i+33
+ bDi+63b
D
i+60b
D
i+21b
D
i+15 + b
D
i+63b
D
i+60b
D
i+52b
D
i+45b
D
i+37
+ bDi+33b
D
i+28b
D
i+21b
D
i+15b
D
i+9
+ bDi+52b
D
i+45b
D
i+37b
D
i+33b
D
i+28b
D
i+21, i ≥ 1
(20)
zDi =
∑
k∈A
bDi+1+k + h(s
D
i+3, s
D
i+25, s
D
i+46, s
D
i+64, b
D
i+64), i ≥ 0
(21)
All the above equations are over GF (2).
Similarly to the case of forcing the LFSR to go one extra
clock, after N clocks of Grain v1 we have 2N + 1 + 160
variables in a system of 3N + 1 equations.
E. Attack outline
The goal of our attack is to find the inner state ISt0 of
the cipher at a time moment t0 after the initialization phase
of Grain v1. At first, we generate N bits of keystream and
add the corresponding equations (1), (2), (3), into a system of
equations S. Then we reset the device to the state ISt0 , induce
a clocking fault into one of the registers and again generate
N bits of keystream and add the corresponding equations for
faulted keystream, LFSR and NFSR bits (equations (4) - (21))
into the system S. If necessary, we reset the device again
and phase-shift a different register and repeat the process. The
number of different phase-shifts/clocking-faults in our attack
is denoted m. We then try to solve the system of non-linear
equations over GF (2) by using SAT-solvers. If a solution is
found, i.e. we know the inner state ISt0 , we can clock the
cipher backwards into the initial state and directly read the
secret key, which is the initial value of NFSR’s bits. The
algorithm is presented in Algorithm 1.
IV. RESULTS
We used the free open-source mathematics software system
SAGE1 for implementation of our experiments. SAGE pro-
vides support for polynomials over GF (2) and an implemen-
tation of a SAT-solver - Cryptominisat 2.9.6. All experiments
were performed on a standard PC (OS Cent OS 6 (Linux),
CPU Intel i5-4200M @ 3.00GHz, 3 GB RAM).
In each experiment we tried to find the inner state of
the cipher ISt0 in time moment t0 in which the faults
were induced, by successfully solving a system of non-linear
equations describing the inner states of the cipher. We were
interested in fast attacks where the solution of the system of
equations could be found in under 12 hours in a standard PC,
i.e. if the SAT-solver did not find the solution in 12 hours, we
terminated the solver and regarded the attack as not successful.
1Available at http://www.sagemath.org
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Algorithm 1: Phase-shift Attack on Grain v1
Input: The number of phase-shifts m, the number of
keystream bits N
Output: Secret K or empty set if K was not found.
1: Set the system of equations S ← ∅
2: Get the device into an unknown inner state ISt0
3: Generate N bits of keystream from the inner state ISt0
4: Insert equations (1),(2),(3) into the system S.
5: for i = 1 to m do
6: Reset the device to the state ISt0 .
7: Induce a clocking fault into one of the registers.
8: Generate N bits of faulted keystream.
9: Insert corresponding equations from (4) - (21) into the
system S.
10: end for
11: Solution ← SAT solver(S)
12: if Solution 6= ∅ then
13: Clock the device backwards from state ISt0 until you
reach the initial state.
14: Read secret key K from the first register.
15: return K.
16: else
17: return ∅.
18: end if
A. All four desynchronizations, no known bits
As a first experiment we induced four different phase-shift
faults, i.e. forcing the LFSR to clock one extra time, forcing
the NFSR to clock one extra time, stopping the LFSR for one
clock, stopping the NFSR for one clock. In all four cases and
also in the unfaulted case we generated 150 bits per keystream
and tried to solve the corresponding system of equations.
Unfortunately, in this case, we were unable to obtain a
solution of the system in under 12 hours, so we terminated the
computation and regarded the attack unsuccessful. As a next
approach, we opted for trying to solve a system of equations
if some of the bits of LFSR at the time moment t0 are known.
B. All four desynchronizations, known bits of LFSR
In this experiment we again induced four different syn-
chronization faults, generated 150 bits per keystream, but also
assumed that we know part of the bits of the LFSR, starting
from s0 to sL (so s0, s1, s2, ..., sL). We constructed the cor-
responding equation system and again applied Cryptominisat
to solve it. It stems from our experiments that if we know at
least 28 bits of the linear register then we are able to find the
inner state ISt0 in under 12 hours.
The resulting times it took our computer to find the inner
state are presented in Table I and Figure 2. The case L =
79 means that we basically know the content of the LFSR
beforehand, in the case L = 27 we know the bits s0, s1, ..., s27.
We repeated the experiment 10 times and averaged the results.
The memory complexity of the attack is M = 15N
equations in 10N+160 variables for N bits of keystream. The
data complexity is D = 5N keystream bits. In our case that is
2250 equations in 1660 variables from 750 bits of keystream.
TABLE I
AVERAGE SOLUTION TIMES FOR DIFFERENT NO. OF KNOWN BITS
L Avg time [s] L Avg time [s] L Avg time [s]
27 42059 45 41 63 5
29 13840 47 21 65 5
31 9820 49 12 67 4
33 935 51 7 69 4
35 1055 53 6 71 4
37 360 55 6 73 5
39 157 57 5 75 2
41 102 59 5 77 2
43 56 61 5 79 2
Fig. 2. Average solution times for different number of known bits
C. Three desynchronizations, known bits of LFSR
In this experiment, we induced only three different faults,
i.e. we performed four different variants of the attack from the
previous section, where we always omitted a different fault.
Our goal was to experimentally determine, which fault had the
largest impact on the attack - omitting which fault would lead
to the largest increase in the time needed to solve the system of
equations. We generated 150 bits per keystream and averaged
100 measurements.
The results are presented in Table II and Figure 3, all times
are measured in seconds. As before, L denotes the number
of known bits of LFSR. Columns denoted A, B, C, and D
are denoted accordingly to the fault, which was omitted in the
experiment from all possible four types of desynchronizations
- the letters correspond to subsections of section 3 of this
paper.
We see that the times are fairly similar, so it is rather difficult
to estimate if omitting a certain type of a fault leads to a longer
solution time than for a different type of a fault. For 50 known
bits (L = 49), we can see that the longest time was needed in
the case when we did not consider the stopping of the LFSR
from clocking (column A).
D. One desynchronizations, known bits of LFSR
In the last experiment, we experimented with inducing
only one fault and investigated what is the time needed to
successfully solve the system of equations. We again used 150
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TABLE II
AVERAGE SOLUTION TIMES IN SECONDS FOR DIFFERENT NO. OF KNOWN
BITS FOR DIFFERENT OMITTED FAULTS
L A B C D
79 2.75 2.78 2.99 3.16
76 3.05 3.48 3.22 3.57
73 3.85 4.10 3.52 4.15
70 3.82 4.50 4.03 4.69
67 4.14 4.61 3.87 4.90
64 4.12 4.88 4.49 3.96
61 4.44 4.42 4.74 4.50
58 5.04 5.03 4.82 4.93
55 6.09 6.32 5.65 6.25
52 7.69 7.67 7.45 8.13
49 13.10 11.22 12.21 11.60
Fig. 3. Average solution times for different omitted faults
bits per keystream. This time, we only investigated the case
when all the bits of LFSR are known (L = 79). We averaged
the times from 100 experiments. In the table, columns are
labeled A, B, C, and D, according to the type of the fault
which was induced into the inner state of the cipher. The
resulting times are presented in Table III.
We see that the solution was found in the shortest time
when we stopped the linear feedback shift register for one
clock (column A). This is in accordance with the results of
the previous experiment, therefore we assume that this type of
a desynchronization fault has the largest impact on the success
of the attack, i.e. on the time the SAT-solver needs to find the
inner state of the cipher from the set of equations.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we presented the results of our simulation
of the phase-shift fault analysis of stream cipher Grain v1
combined with methods of algebraic cryptanalysis - SAT
solvers. Our experiments show that the induction of 4 possible
desynchronization faults: stopping the LFSR for one clock,
TABLE III
AVERAGE SOLUTION TIMES IN SECONDS FOR DIFFERENT INDUCED FAULTS
L A B C D
79 166.12 213.14 112.79 191.77
forcing the LFSR to clock one more time, stopping the NFSR
for one clock and forcing the NFSR to clock one more time can
lead to an attack that requires 150 bits of keystream per each
generated sequence and 28 known bits of LFSR to successfully
find the inner state of the cipher ISt0 , which can then be
clocked backwards to find the secret key K.
We also investigated which type of desynchronization fault
might be the most useful from the attacker’s point of view.
It stems from our experiments that the stopping of the linear
feedback shift register for one clock is the best choice, since
if we considered only this fault and solved the system of
corresponding equations, the overall time was the lowest and
if we omitted only this fault from the set of all possible four,
the overall time of solving the system was the highest from
the ones considered.
Of course, the physical implementation of phase-shifting
is an issue and so far no implementation of this type of an
attack has been published in the open literature. In [4] the
authors argue that such an attack could be mounted on a
device in ”test” mode, where the tester is usually able to run
single components of the device alone, or that such an attack
could be implemented as a ”backdoor” of the device by the
manufacturing company.
If the device with its wirings and clocking is securely
implemented, then this fault attack is of little to no concern to
the user. However, if the attacker is able to induce this type of
a fault and may manipulate with the clocking of the individual
components, then it can lead to an attack with low data and
memory complexity.
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